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The focus of this Essay is on the importance of apparent honesty to the 
persuasive force of Supreme Court opinions.1  Several scholars and Justices of 
                                                 
 + Clinical Professor of Law and Director, Black Lung Clinic, Washington & Lee University 
School of Law.  I wish to extend my thanks to the many individuals who provided their advice 
and suggestions regarding this Essay.  Particularly, I would like to thank Professors Tom Tyler 
and Scott C. Idleman for their willingness to share their time and thoughts on the role of honesty 
in judicial decision-making and Professors Gisela Striker, Chris Jenks, and Margaret Hu for their 
generosity in reviewing the Essay and providing invaluable edits. 
 1. Apparent honesty is the idea that Justices must both be honest and appear honest.  The 
focus of this Article is distinct from judicial candor.  Many scholars have addressed the topic of 
judicial sincerity, judicial candor, and judicial fidelity to the law.  See, e.g., Erin F. 
Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1, 12–
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the United States Supreme Court have noted that the Court’s legitimacy is 
uniquely tied to the persuasive force of its opinions.2  Alexander Hamilton 
famously described the federal judiciary as possessing “neither force nor will 
but merely judgement.”3  Hamilton employed this phrase to support his 
argument that the judicial branch “will always be the least dangerous to the 
political rights of the Constitution.”4  However, more than explaining the 
infirmities of the federal judiciary as compared to the executive or legislative 
branches, Hamilton captured something essential about the judiciary.  The 
Supreme Court’s judgments are both the exercise of the Court’s power and the 
justification for that power.  Thus, the opinions of its Justices must be persuasive. 
The study of persuasion has long recognized three principle methods or modes 
of convincing an audience of the correctness of a particular view.5  Those 
                                                 
16 (2016); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Limits of Judicial Fidelity to Law: The Coxford Lecture, 24 
CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 305, 305 (2011); Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 
TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1310–13, 1386–87 (1995) (analyzing the arguments for a pro-candor rule in 
judicial-opinion writing and then asserting that the arguments in favor of the pro-candor default are 
unpersuasive); Therese H. Maynard et al., Symposium Transcript, Panel Exchange the Fourth 
Annual Fritz B. Burns Lecture Central Bank: The Methodology, the Message, and the Future, 29 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 73, 85 (1995); David L. Shapiro, Essays Commemorating the One Hundredth 
Anniversary of the Harvard Law Review: In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 
731 (1987) [hereinafter Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor]; Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 156 (1994) [hereinafter Shapiro, Judges as Liars]; see also 
Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When May Legal Decision Makers Lie?, 59 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1091, 1096 (2010) (pointing out that the sincerity debate is more far reaching than 
just judicial decision makers and discusses the role of sincerity in the explanations of all public 
decision makers). 
 2. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (“The Court’s power lies…in 
its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in people’s acceptance of the 
Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands.”); see 
also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional 
Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1207, 1254 (1984) (“The Court can establish 
its legitimacy by writing persuasive opinions that justify its conclusions.  Hence, as long as the 
Court follows this socially accepted judicial role, it is likely to retain its legitimacy regardless of 
the theory of judicial discretion that it employs.”); Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart 
of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 99–101 (1959) (arguing that Supreme Court opinions can 
undermine the Court’s legitimacy because they are often poorly written and have an insufficient 
basis in law); Gerald Lebovits, Alifya V. Curtin & Lisa Solomon, Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 
21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 237 (2008) (“The judiciary’s power comes from its words alone—
judges command no army and control no purse.  In a democracy, judges have legitimacy only when 
their words deserve respect, and their words deserve respect only when those who utter them are 
ethical.”). But see Marc O. DeGirolami, Congressional Threats of Removal Against Federal 
Judges, 10 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 111, 152 (2005). 
 3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 38 (George A. Kennedy 
trans., 2nd ed. 2007) (identifying three modes of persuasion: “the character [(ethos)] of the 
speaker…disposing the listener in some way and…the speech [(logos)] itself, by showing or 
seeming to show something”). 
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methods are appeals to logic,6 credibility,7 and emotion.8  All three methods of 
persuasion, in proper balance, are necessary and appropriate tools of rhetoric, 
but I assert that ethos/credibility is particularly important to a court, and, more 
specifically, to the United States Supreme Court. 
Philosophers have discussed the significance of ethos to persuasion for 
thousands of years.  As part of this discussion, ethos has been defined in a variety 
of ways but generally centers on the idea of credibility.9  Plato suggested that 
true rhetoric requires a speaker to understand the soul of his audience and then 
to appeal to it.10  Aristotle asserted that appeals to ethos are “almost…the most 
authoritative form of persuasion.”11  He went on to explain that ethos-based 
appeals include convincing an audience that the speaker is: of good moral 
character; has good will for/toward the audience; and has good sense.12  Modern 
rhetoricians like Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca13 and Blitzer14 have continued to 
                                                 
 6. See id. at 38–39 (“Persuasion occurs through the arguments [(logoi)] when we show the 
truth or the apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case.”). 
 7. See id. at 38 (“[There is persuasion] through character whenever the speech is spoken in 
such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence….”). 
 8. See id. at 39 (“[There is persuasion] through the hearers when they are led to feel emotion 
[(pathos)] by the speech….”). 
 9. See James S. Baumlin & Craig A. Meyer, Positioning Ethos in/for the Twenty-First 
Century: An Introduction to Histories of Ethos, 7 HUMANITIES 1, 4 (2018).  Baumlin and Meyer 
note: 
Like many terms from Greek philosophy (logos, pistis, kairos, to give a few) ethos 
remains untranslatable in any word-for-word correspondence.  Numerous terms gesture 
in its direction, though no one word or phrase captures its nuances in English.  Character, 
authority, charisma, credence, credibility, trust, trustworthiness, sincerity, “good sense,” 
goodwill, expertise, reliability, authenticity, subjectivity, “the subject,” self, selfhood, 
self-identity, image, reputation, cultural identity, habit, habitus, habituation, person, 
persona, impersonation, performance, self-fashioning, voice, personal style: these make 
for a sampling of stand-in terms. 
Id. 
 10. JAMES A. HERRICK, THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF RHETORIC: AN INTRODUCTION (4th 
ed. 2009) (quoting PLATO, PHAEDRUS 70) (noting that rhetoric was the “art of influencing the 
soul…through words” and to effectively influence an individual the speaker “must discover the 
kind of speech that matches each type of nature”); see also ETHOS: NEW ESSAYS IN RHETORICAL 
AND CRITICAL THEORY xv–xvi (James S. Baumlin & Tita French Baumlin eds., 1994) (noting that 
Aristotle’s discussion of ethos is in response to “Plato’s call for an ethical rhetoric, a rhetoric 
addressed to the soul of the individual”). 
 11. ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 39. 
 12. James L. Kinneavy & Susan C. Warshauer, From Aristotle to Madison Avenue: Ethos and 
Ethics of Argument, in ETHOS: NEW ESSAYS IN RHETORICAL AND CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 
10, at 171, 174–80. 
 13. See CH. PERELMAN & L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON 
ARGUMENTATION 22 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969) (1958) (“A great orator is 
one who possesses the art of taking into consideration, in his argument, the composite nature of his 
audience.”). 
 14. See Lloyd F. Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, 1 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1, 7–9 (1968).  
Bitzer’s influential work identified three constituent parts of any given rhetorical situation.  One of 
those parts is the audience.  According to Bitzer, “Since rhetorical discourse produces change by 
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assert that advocates must craft their rhetoric with the composition of their 
audience in mind.  Thus, when making an ethos-based appeal the speaker should 
adjust his/her appeal to the character-based expectations of a particular audience.  
We can call this “role-based credibility.”  I assert that this “role-based 
credibility” is particularly important in the context of Supreme Court opinions—
perhaps even the most important component to a Justice’s opinion.  I further 
assert that of the various factors that affect the credibility of a Justice’s opinion, 
apparent honesty is the most important. 
This Essay draws a distinction between apparent and actual honesty that 
should be explained.  Judicial honesty or judicial candor is the subject of 
significant scholarly attention, but it is not the focus of this Essay.  Rather, my 
focus is on the importance that appearing honest has on the persuasive force of 
an opinion and the dangers associated with failing to achieve that goal.  This 
distinction is not intended to suggest Justices should seek apparent honesty while 
not being actually honest.  Rather, this Essay emphasizes that actually honest 
opinions must also be apparently honest.  Thus, judicial candor is necessary to 
apparent honesty, but it is not always sufficient on its own. 
To support my assertions, this Essay is divided into three Sections.  Section I 
briefly discusses the elements of an Aristotelian ethos-based appeal and how 
such appeals are generally derived. Section II applies this approach to Supreme 
Court opinions and attempts to defend my formulation of apparent honesty.  
Finally, I identify friction points in Supreme Court decisions where there is a 
heightened danger of appearing less than fully honest.  Given the harm failing 
to appear honest can have on the Court’s credibility, avoiding such an 
appearance is critical.  I assert that there are at least three circumstances where 
the danger of appearing less than fully honest is increased.  These three 
credibility “choke points” involve stare decisis, high-profile politically 
contentious cases, and changes in a Justice’s position. 
I. ETHOS: “THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE FORM OF PERSUASION”15 
As mentioned above, Aristotle claimed appeals to character are “almost…the 
most authoritative form of persuasion.”16  This quote is particularly relevant to 
opinions issued by Supreme Court Justices because, as Aristotle observed, 
appeals to ethos are especially powerful “in cases where there is not exact 
knowledge but room for doubt.”17  In most, if not all, cases heard by the Supreme 
Court there is room for doubt, otherwise the Court would not have granted 
certiorari. 
                                                 
influencing the decision and action of persons who function as mediators of change, it follows that 
rhetoric always requires an audience….”  Id. at 7. 
 15. ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 39. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 38. 
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The Greek word ethos is frequently translated in English to mean character 
and is similar to the word ethics.18  Both ethics and character suggest a fixed 
pattern or habit of behavior.  However, in the context of Aristotelian rhetoric, 
ethos has a more fluid definition.19  Further, what I speak of in this Essay is not 
ethical opinion writing.  Rather, I speak of ethos in Supreme Court opinions as 
Aristotle described its use in On Rhetoric,20 as a practical tool of persuasion and 
how apparent honesty is a necessary part of that tool. 
According to Aristotle, ethos as a tool of persuasion, includes three 
component parts: “[t]hese are practical wisdom [phronēsis] and virtue [aretē] 
and good will [eunoia].”21  Each component is explained in some detail either 
explicitly or implicitly in On Rhetoric,22 but these terms can perhaps be better 
understood in the following way: we trust advocates if we believe they have 
good judgment, are good people, and wish good things for us—the audience. 
It is important, however, to note that Aristotle is not speaking of ethical 
persuasion, but rather the use of appeals to the character of the speaker to 
persuade.23  This distinction is worth some explanation.  Ethical persuasion, 
which is a subject of significant importance in the law, focuses on the fair use of 
argument.24  It is well understood that appeals to an audience’s bias or prejudice 
can have an inordinate impact on the outcome of a dispute.  Thus, arguments 
which play on these flaws in human decision making can be described as 
unethical, as the argument is designed to cloud a decision with what should be 
                                                 
 18. See id. 
 19. There are a number of distinct views of the role of ethos among classical rhetoricians.  Of 
particular note is the distinction between Aristotle’s approach and Cicero and Quintilian’s.  
Aristotle discusses ethos as a manner of persuasion, while Cicero and Quintilian assert that people 
of good moral character make the best advocates.  See Tita French Baumlin, “A good (wo)man 
skilled in speaking”: Ethos, Self-Fashioning, and Gender in Renaissance England, in ETHOS: NEW 
ESSAYS IN RHETORICAL AND CRITICAL THEORY, supra note 10, at 229, 232 (noting how Cicero 
and Quintilian focused on ethos as a speaker’s characteristic rather than as a principle method of 
persuasion).  It is noteworthy that some scholars have asserted that Cicero and Quintilian do address 
ethos, but they discuss it as it manifests in the speaker’s manner.  According to Cicero, the 
obligations of the speaker include charming the audience through manners “or uncorruptibility of 
the speaker as of affability or manners.”  GEORGE KENNEDY, QUINTILLIAN 75 (1969).  Others 
assert that “the orator cannot be perfect unless he is a good man.”  Baumlin, supra, at 232 (internal 
citation omitted). 
 20. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 39. 
 21. Id. at 112. 
 22. The title of Aristotle’s work has been translated in several different ways.  Some authors 
have referred to Aristotle’s work as Rhetoric (C.D.C. Reeve trans.), The Art of Rhetoric (John 
Henry Freese trans.), or Treatise on Rhetoric (Theodore Buckley trans).  In this Article, I rely on 
George Kennedy’s translation, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. See ARISTOTLE, supra 
note 5. 
 23. See id. at 38. 
 24. See RICHARD L. JOHANNESEN, PERSPECTIVES ON ETHICS IN PERSUASION 28-29 (1995). 
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irrelevant to the resolution of the dispute.25  Ethos in argumentation is the 
process of convincing an audience that you possess the qualities of practical 
wisdom, virtue (which will be described below), and good will toward the 
audience.26  A reader might ask, is being ethical not the same as appearing 
ethical?  Or said another way, do not those who act ethically also appear ethical?  
My response would be not always.  It is easy to envision a circumstance where 
an ethical individual may make an argument that appears to lack credibility.  A 
famous example can be drawn from the 1988 United States presidential race. 
In the 1988 presidential race, then Vice President George H. Bush was running 
against Governor Michael Dukakis.  During a debate between the candidates, 
Governor Dukakis was asked, “Governor, if Kitty Dukakis [(Governor 
Dukakis’s wife)] were raped and murdered, would you favor an irrevocable 
death penalty for the killer?”27  The Governor had a long and well established 
record of opposing the death penalty.28  Governor Dukakis’ response was, “No, 
I don’t…I think you know that I’ve opposed the death penalty during all of my 
life.”29  After Governor Dukakis gave his answer, observers in the press room 
said, “He’s through.”30  Governor Dukakis lost the election, and although his 
defeat cannot be blamed entirely on this response, it is widely believed to have 
contributed to the loss.31 
Given Governor Dukakis’ life-long, steadfast opposition to the death penalty, 
it is likely that his answer was honest, but it did not appear credible.  Some have 
pointed out that the Governor’s response was without emotion, and so it could 
be framed as a failure in pathos (appealing to emotion),32 but I believe the failure 
was also ethos based.33  In addition to appearing cold, the Governor’s answer 
                                                 
 25. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 31–32 (stating that it is wrong to guide a jury towards 
emotions like “anger or envy or pity” and comparing such an appeal to these emotions with making 
a “straight-edge ruler crooked before using it”). 
 26. See id. at 112. 
 27. Roger Simon, Questions that Killed Candidates’ Careers, POLITICO (Apr. 20, 2007 6:09 
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2007/04/questions-that-kill-candidates-careers-003617. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. It is at least worth noting that even years later Governor Dukakis did not believe the 
answer was that bad.  See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, Armed Standoff: The Impasse in Gun 
Legislation and Litigation: Article: Sound-bite Gun Fights: Three Decades of Presidential 
Debating About Firearms, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1015, 1022–23 (2005); M.J. Stephey, Top Ten 
Memorable Debate Moments: Dukakis’ Deadly Response, TIME (2019), 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1844704_1844706_1844712,00.ht
ml (last visited Sep. 10, 2020). 
 32. See ROBERT N. SAYLER &MOLLY BISHOP SHADEL, TONGUE-TIED AMERICA: REVIVING 
THE ART OF VERBAL PERSUASION 182–83 (2nd ed. 2014). 
 33. Professor Sayler has discussed the example of Governor Dukakis’ answer to the question 
regarding his wife in lectures as part of the class he co-teaches with Professor Shadel.  During these 
lectures Professor Sayler discusses Governor Dukakis’ answer as a failure of pathos, ethos, and 
logos.  See, e.g., Simon, supra note 27. 
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simply did not appear believable.  Perhaps the Governor could have said 
something like, “If someone raped and murdered Kitty I would want to kill that 
person myself, but what if I was wrong?  What if the person I believed committed 
these horrible crimes did not?  The horror of the crimes you describe would be 
redoubled by the state sanctioned murder of an innocent citizen.”  It is easy to 
arm-chair quarterback such events, but the point is, being a person of character 
and using appeals to character in argument are distinct. 
A. Virtue 
Aristotle discusses the nature of virtue in both On Rhetoric and The 
Nicomachean Ethics.34  In On Rhetoric, Aristotle states, “[V]irtue…is an 
ability…that is productive and preservative of goods, and an ability for doing 
good in many and great ways, actually in all ways in all things.”35  He goes on 
to describe some of the subparts of virtue as, “justice, manly courage, 
self-control, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness, prudence, and 
wisdom.”36 
Although honesty or truthfulness is not explicitly mentioned in this 
description, it is described as a virtue in The Nicomachean Ethics37 and is clearly 
at the heart of Aristotle’s consideration of virtue with regard to persuasion.  As 
described in On Rhetoric, Aristotle also states that the adverse outcome of a lack 
of virtue is where an advocate “do[es] not say what [he] think[s] because of a 
bad character.”38  Thus, we trust good people, at least in part, because good 
people do not lie. 
B. Practical Wisdom 
Aristotle described practical wisdom or prudence as the characteristic of being 
able to “deliberate well.”39  This sort of statement has led some to describe 
Aristotle’s definition of practical wisdom as “notoriously cryptic.”40  However, 
it seems understandable that defining practical wisdom would, by necessity, 
have to be general, just as explaining or defining common sense.  In an apparent 
nod to the importance of practical wisdom, Aristotle wrote, “Prudence as well 
                                                 
 34. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 61–65, 75–83; see generally ARISTOTLE, THE 
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (H. Rackham trans., 1934) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (discussing the concept of moral 
virtue and how man can acquire it). 
 35. ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 76. 
 36. Id.  
 37. See id. at 241.  Much of Aristotle’s Book IV is devoted to discussing prudence/practical 
wisdom, however much of that discussion appears to be categorical: explaining how prudence is 
different from scientific knowledge, or wisdom, or explaining how the various intellectual virtues 
differ from the moral virtues.  Id. 
 38. Id. at 112. 
 39. Id. at 345. 
 40. Brett Scharffs, The Role of Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 127, 135–36 (1998). 
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as Moral Virtue determines the complete performance of man’s proper function: 
Virtue ensures the rightness of the end we aim at, Prudence ensures the rightness 
of the means we adopt to gain that end.”41  This, and other passages have caused 
some to refer to practical wisdom as the master virtue.42  This discussion is 
consistent with Aristotle’s emphasis on virtue as a practical philosophy where 
theory must be put into action.43 
C. Good Will or Well Disposed Toward the Audience44 
George Kennedy, a noted classical scholar, has observed that Aristotle’s 
discussion of displaying good will toward an audience describes a more 
pragmatic approach to connecting with an audience than other classical 
philosophers, but is also more “open to possible abuse.”45  This seems quite 
accurate.  Aristotle suggests that speakers adjust their rhetorical appeals to the 
psychological make-up of the audience.46  For example, Aristotle asserts that the 
character of the young includes that, “they are impulsive and quick-tempered 
and inclined to follow up their anger.”47  Thus, a speaker should be aware of 
such qualities in the process of persuasion. 
At first, this aspect of ethos-based persuasion would seem least concerned 
with honesty or truth.  If viewed in isolation, Aristotle seems to infer that a 
speaker should manipulate his audience based on the presumed biases or 
prejudices of that group.48  However, in the broader context of On Rhetoric, that 
does not seem accurate.  First, Aristotle identifies the value and purpose of 
rhetoric, stating, “[R]hetoric is useful…because the true and the just are by 
nature stronger than their opposites.”49  Further, Aristotle rejects the authors who 
seek to manipulate the emotions of the audiences to achieve a victory.50  He 
specifically explains: 
[O]ne should be able to argue persuasively on either side of a 
question…not that we may actually do both (for one should not 
persuade what is debased) but in order that it may not escape our notice 
                                                 
 41. ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 367. 
 42. See Mark L. Jones, Developing Virtue and Practical Wisdom in the Legal Profession and 
Beyond, 68 MERCER L. REV. 833, 843 (2017). 
 43. See Marcel Becker, Aristotelian Ethics and Aristotelian Rhetoric, in ARISTOTLE AND THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: THEORY, PRACTICE AND JUSTICE 114 (Liesbeth Huppes-Cluysenaer & 
Nuno M.M.S. Coelho eds., 2013). 
 44. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 74. 
 45. Id. at 148. 
 46. See id. at 149. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 148. 
 49. Id. at 35. 
 50. See id. at 31.  Aristotle writes, “[I]t is wrong to warp the jury by leading them into anger 
or envy or pity: that is the same as if someone made a straight-edge ruler crooked before using it.”  
Id. at 31–32. 
2020] The Value of Apparent Honesty in Supreme Court Opinions 255 
what the real state of the case is and that we ourselves may be able to 
refute if another person uses speech unjustly.51 
It seems more likely that Aristotle’s reference to being well disposed to an 
audience is advice to ensure speakers do not alienate an audience.  As I will 
discuss below, I assert that apparent honesty in the context of Justices on the 
Supreme Court is a necessary component of being “well disposed to” the 
Supreme Court’s audience. 
D. Audience Expectation 
Since the Peloponnesian War, rhetoricians have understood the importance of 
meeting the needs and expectations of an audience.52  Adjusting the method of 
persuasion to an audience has been discussed at length by classical rhetorical 
philosophers like Aristotle and Cicero,53 and modern rhetoricians like Kenneth 
Burk, Chaim Perelman, and Lucy Olbrechts-Tyteca.54 
An early example of this dynamic is illustrated by Thucydides in The History 
of the Peloponnesian War.55  Thucydides describes the process by which the 
Spartans deliberated on whether to go to war with Athens and its allies.56  The 
decision was made by the Spartan assembly.57  The Spartan King, Archidamus, 
urged a calm reflective decision making process,58 while the Spartan ephor,59 
Sthenelaidas, urged immediate violent action.60  Although the Spartan King 
offered several valid, logical reasons to approach the decision to go to war 
cautiously, the less reasoned, more passionate speech carried the day.61  One 
scholar has asserted that despite Archidamus’ speech being more logical, he 
failed to account for his audience.62  The Spartan assembly was suspicious of 
long speeches, and was comprised of many soldiers who were in an angry frame 
                                                 
 51. Id. at 35. 
 52. See David Cohen, The Politics of Deliberation: Oratory and Democracy in Classical 
Athens, in A COMPANION TO RHETORIC AND RHETORICAL CRITICISM 22, 25–26 (Walter Jost & 
Wendy Olmsted eds., 2004) (describing the deliberative process among the Spartans prior to the 
vote on whether to go to war with Athens and pointing out that the most persuasive speech will 
often be the one most tailored to the audience). 
 53. See HERRICK, supra note 10, at 8–9, 108. 
 54. See id. at 10. 
 55. See THUCYDIDES, THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 33-43 (Richard Crawley 
trans., 2017) (1874). 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id.  
 58. See id.  
 59. See Ephor, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1997) (defining 
an ephor as “one of five ancient Spartan magistrates having power over the king” in ancient 
Greece). 
 60. See THUCYDIDES, supra note 55, at 43. 
 61. See Cohen, supra note 52, at 26–27. 
 62. See id. 
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of mind.63  Sthenelaidas presented a shorter, impassioned speech that played on 
the Spartan’s fear of Athens growing even more powerful.64 
II. ETHOS, HONESTY, AND THE SUPREME COURT 
As discussed above, there is already a strong connection between the 
sub-elements of ethos-based appeals and honesty.  Below, I will argue that this 
connection is even stronger when viewed in the context of the opinion of a 
Supreme Court Justice.  The Supreme Court’s audience is as diverse as any.  
Justices seek to persuade the parties to the action, the public, lawyers, judges, 
law enforcement, politicians, one another, and future audiences—particularly 
future Justices of the Supreme Court.  Nearly all the constituent parts of the 
Supreme Court’s audience expect truthfulness.  This expectation is manifest in 
the idealized symbols of the Court, the structure of our government, and 
empirically supported by the scholarship of social psychologists and law 
professors researching procedural justice.65  I will discuss one possible exception 
to this broad expectation of truth.  This exception would apply in the 
circumstance where what is legally correct is morally wrong.  We can call this 
the moral lie doctrine.  The moral lie doctrine is arguably a sub-category of the 
more commonly known idea of a noble lie.66  Several legal scholars have 
suggested that in exceedingly rare circumstances a judge’s duty to the truth may 
                                                 
 63. See id. 
 64. See THUCYDIDES, supra note 55, at 43 (“Vote therefore, Lacedaemonians, for war, as the 
honour of Sparta demands, and neither allow the further aggrandizement of Athens, nor betray our 
allies….”). 
 65. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 7 (2002) (explaining that people’s perception of 
procedural justice is influenced by the degree to which they find the actors are honest and unbiased); 
Symbols of Law Information Sheet, OFF. OF THE CURATOR, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/SymbolsofLawInfoSheet%209-28-2015_Final.pdf 
(last updated Sep. 28, 2015) (describing  the  scales  of  justice  adorning  the  Supreme Court 
building). 
 66. Numerous law review articles discuss the concept of noble lies in the context of judicial 
decision making.  The term noble lie is often traced back to Plato’s Republic, where he discusses 
creating an ideal society.  According to Plato, as part of the ideal society there should be one or two 
founding noble lies.  These lies, like all the citizens are of a single heritage or that the hierarchy of 
society was divinely ordained, serve to bind and improve society.  See Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1773 (2013) (“The noble lie 
requires that the true justification for a practice remain concealed from the population subject to a 
beneficial illusion, which means that judges cannot publicly offer that justification within the 
system.”).  I distinguish a noble lie from a moral lie in this paper and assert a moral lie is a 
subcategory of a noble lie.  Thus, all moral lies are noble lies but not all noble lies are moral lies.  
Justices may commit a noble lie simply because they feel their proposed solution is the best for all 
concerned to resolve a problem but do not feel the current legal framework would support their 
conclusion.  I make this distinction primarily because most of the scholars who discuss the 
permissibility of a judicial lie do so when it is the morally right thing to do, not just the better 
outcome.  See id. at 1785. 
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be trumped by a moral duty.67  I will suggest, at least in the circumstance of a 
Supreme Court Justice, the moral lie doctrine should not apply. 
A. Images of Justice 
One of the most dominant images associated with the United States Supreme 
Court are the scales of justice.  The scales appear both inside the Court and 
outside.68  In the circular published by the Court, the scales of justice are 
described as “[s]ymbolizing the impartial deliberation, or ‘weighing,’ of two 
sides in a legal dispute….”69  In several of these images the scales are held by a 
blindfolded individual, further indicating the impartiality of the Court and, more 
broadly, justice.70  I would also assert that blindfolded justice goes beyond mere 
impartiality.  Blindfolding the individual holding the scales removes even the 
possibility of dishonesty. 
The Supreme Court is, in theory, our nation’s most sophisticated scale of 
justice.71  However, this assumes that the Justices of the Court are not placing a 
metaphoric finger on one side of the balance.  A Justice’s opinion is, in effect, 
that individual’s account of the weighing.  But to lie in an opinion is to give a 
false weight, and it can be reasonably argued that a scale that does not measure 
accurately is a scale not worth having. 
Of course, it could also be argued that the Supreme Court is nothing like a 
scale, and the scales on the Court are merely adornment.  Usually, a scale 
                                                 
 67. See Scott C. Idleman, supra note 1, at 1381 (analyzing the arguments for a pro-candor 
rule in judicial opinion writing and then asserting that there are occasions where this pro-candor 
default is inappropriate); see also Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, supra note 1, at 747; 
Goldsworthy, supra note 1, at 305; Richard H. Fallon Jr., A Theory of Judicial Candor, 117 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2265, 2311, 2315 (2017) [hereinafter Fallon, A Theory of Judicial Candor]; Richard H. 
Fallon Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1834–37 (2005) [hereinafter 
Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution]. 
 68. See Symbols of Law Information Sheet, supra note 65.  There the scales are described as: 
The Scales of Justice: Perhaps the most ancient symbol associated with the law is also 
one of the most familiar, the Scales of Justice.  Symbolizing the impartial deliberation, 
or “weighing,” of two sides in a legal dispute, the scales are found throughout the 
building. 
Locations: In the Courtroom Frieze, scales are held by Equity in the north panel, Divine 
Inspiration in the west panel, and are on the shield held by Youth in the east panel. The 
West Pediment includes a figure of Liberty with the scales in her lap. On the front plaza, 
the small blindfolded statue within Contemplation of Justice clutches them to her body, 
the figure of Justice on the two lampposts hold them, and a small figure on the flagpole 
base has them, too. The scales are also incorporated in the design of the bronze elevator 
doorframes . . . , as a part of a repeating relief on the building’s exterior, as one of the 
metopes in the Great Hall, and as a decorative motif on the ceiling of the Special 
Library[.] 
Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See Introduction to the Federal Court System, OFFS. U.S. ATT’, 
https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/federal-courts (last visited Sep. 10, 2020). 
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measures two objects in relation to one another based on the single quality of 
measure.  In many cases, the Supreme Court is called upon to balance the diverse 
needs of a nation: individual rights against the public good; policy needs against 
litigant needs; responsible adaptations to new realities against stare decisis; and 
the Court’s power against the other branches of government.  Take, for example, 
the case of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.72  The 
Court had to navigate questions of legislative and state authority, individual 
rights, and judicial interpretation of statutory language, while the nation watched 
and waited for its decision.73  Thus, the scale metaphor fails to capture the full 
range of competing interests at stake in some cases. 
To this argument, it can be countered that because of the complexity of the 
matters that are considered by the Court, the opinions of its Justices must remain 
at their essence simple.  In the end, every decision the Court makes balances 
evidence, arguments, and policies in a context where one side will win, and one 
side will lose.  Some Justices on the Supreme Court have likened being a judge 
to being an umpire in baseball.74  An umpire is called upon to do more than just 
ensure the rules of baseball are followed.75  Umpires encourage sportsman like 
conduct, look out for the safety of players, and ensure the game moves along in 
a timely manner, but none of that matters if they do not call balls and strikes 
honestly.76 
B. The Baggage of Life Tenure 
Audience expectation of truthfulness can also be inferred by the unique place 
the Supreme Court occupies in our republic.  The Court is distinctly 
undemocratic.  Unelected and serving for life, Justices are not subject to the will 
of the people in the traditional sense.77  If the people of the United States are 
                                                 
 72. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 73. See id. at 562–65. 
 74. See, e.g., Scott Shane, In Capital and at the Court, Baseball Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/05/politics/politicsspecial1/in-capital-and-at-the-court-
baseball-rules.html?_r=0 (noting that “John G. Roberts Jr., talk[ed] his way to confirmation as 
Chief Justice of the United States with the insight that ‘judges are like umpires’”) (emphasis added); 
see also Thomas Jipping, Is a Judge a Player or an Umpire?, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://www.heritage.org/courts/commentary/judge-player-or-umpire (“Judge Brett Kavanaugh 
has embraced the parallel between a judge and an umpire.  In [a] March 2015 speech at Catholic 
University School of Law, for example, he outlined ten principles by which a ‘good judge’ is like 
an umpire.  ‘To be an umpire as a judge,’ he said, ‘means to follow the law and not to make or re-
make the law—and to be impartial in how we go about doing that.’”). 
 75. See Jason Iuliano, The Supreme Court’s Noble Lie, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 911, 931–32 
(2018); see also Roberts: ‘My Job is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch or Bat’, CNN (Sept. 
12, 2005 4:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/ (noting that 
before becoming Chief Justice, John Roberts famously declared that as a judge his job was to call 
the balls and strikes, not to pitch or bat). 
 76. See Iuliano, supra note 75, at 931–34. 
 77. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Questioning Justice: Law and Politics in Judicial 
Confirmation Hearings, 115 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 38, 39 (2006). 
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unsatisfied with Congress or a President, they can do something about it.78  
Citizens regularly vote politicians or political parties out of power when they are 
dissatisfied—this is not possible with Supreme Court Justices.79  So long as a 
Justice serves with good behavior—which is to say, is not impeached—they will 
remain on the High Court.80  In the history of the Court, only one Justice has 
ever faced impeachment, and that was in 1805.81 
The need for life tenure is well-explained in Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist 
Paper No. 78.82  Hamilton asserts that in order for the judiciary to be independent 
of pressure from the executive and legislative branches or the passions of the 
majority in a given moment, its Justices must be life-tenured and removable only 
if they fail to meet the good behavior standard.83  The judiciary’s independence 
is a necessary provision to ensure that the will of the people, as expressed in the 
Constitution, is fulfilled.84  However, the fact that the people, who are superior 
to all branches of government,85 have the final word is critical to this 
arrangement.  With respect to Supreme Court Justices, that final word cannot be 
exercised through the traditional method of voting.86  Rather, that final word 
must be exercised by alteration of the Constitution.87 
With regard to the Constitution, if the people are dissatisfied with a particular 
interpretation by the Supreme Court, they can vote to amend the document.88  
                                                 
 78. See House of Representatives, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/reference/ 
reference_index_subjects/House_of_Representatives_vrd.htm (last visited Sep. 10, 2020) 
(explaining that Representatives serve for two-year terms, after which they must seek re-election); 
Senators, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_index_subjects/ 
Senators_vrd.htm (last visited Sep. 10, 2020) (explaining that Senators serve for six-year terms, 
after which they must seek re-election); Tom Murse, How Many Years a President Can Serve in 
the White House, THOUGHTCO, https://www.thoughtco.com/why-presidents-only-serve-two-
terms-3367979 (last updated Aug. 12, 2019) (explaining that Presidents serve for four-year terms, 
and may only be elected twice). 
 79. See Post & Siegel, supra note 77, at 39. 
 80. See, e.g., Samuel Chase Impeached, FED. JUD. CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/samuel-chase-impeached (last visited Sep. 10, 2020) 
(explaining that Samuel Chase was the only Supreme Court Justice to be indicted but was acquitted 
because the charges against him were political in nature). 
 81. See id. 
 82. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 3, at 463–65 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. at 469–70. 
 85. See id. at 466–67. 
 86. Post & Siegel, supra note 77,  at 39 (suggesting that the demands of democracy are 
fulfilled through the Senate confirmation process). 
 87. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 3, at 468–69 (Alexander Hamilton); see 
also Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
197 (1952) (arguing that democratic principles are realized through the provisions for amending 
the Constitution). 
 88. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose 
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds 
260 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 69.2:1 
For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut,89 the Court ruled that the Constitution 
contains a right to privacy that is inferred based on the penumbras and 
emanations of several amendments to the Constitution.90  In Roe v. Wade, the 
Court further concluded the right of privacy includes a woman’s right to choose 
whether to continue with a pregnancy or not.91  This interpretation has been met 
with significant resistance.92  The people have the option to change the 
Constitution to either extend protection to unborn children or to explicitly 
recognize a right to privacy that does not include abortion.93  However, if the 
Court does not provide a truthful basis upon which it has concluded a law is 
contrary to the Constitution, the people may be prevented from having their final 
say. 
At least two arguments might be raised against the above assertion.  First, the 
Supreme Court’s audience does not really concern itself with the undemocratic 
aspect of the Court.94  Second, amending the Constitution is such a rare event 
and is so difficult to achieve, that it is not a valid option and thus serves as a 
false reason to claim the Court’s audience expects honesty in a Justice’s 
opinion.95 
To the first argument, it could be claimed its major premise is flawed.  The 
undemocratic nature of the Court has been a significant concern to the public at 
various times in American history.96  The Court’s uniquely unaccountable 
                                                 
of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either 
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified 
by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three 
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 
Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One 
thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses 
in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be 
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. 
Id. 
 89. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 90. See id. at 484 (explaining that the guarantees protected by the First, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments “create zones of privacy” implicitly protected by the Constitution). 
 91. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 92. See, e.g., Ashley Parker, 40 Years After Roe v. Wade, Thousands March to Oppose 
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/us/politics/40-years-
after-roe-v-wade-thousands-march-to-oppose-abortion.html. 
 93. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 94. But see George Mace, The Antidemocratic Character of Judicial Review, 60 CAL. L. 
REV. 1140, 1141 (1972) (noting the public sees a contradiction with the court’s unelected structure 
and democracy). 
 95. See Constitutional Amendment Process, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Aug. 15, 
2016), https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/constitution (last visited Sep. 10, 2020) 
(explaining the lengthy, multi-step process to pass an amendment to the Constitution). 
 96. See, e.g., Mace, supra note 94, at 1141 (noting that many believe “judicial review is not 
consistent with the spirit and form of democratic government”). 
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position was a matter of debate in the Federalist and Anti-federalist Papers.97  
Andrew Jackson was reelected in 1832, despite challenging the Supreme Court’s 
supremacy in constitutional interpretation.98  He claimed that as the true 
representative of the people, he had equal authority with the Supreme Court to 
interpret the Constitution, and suggested he was not bound by the Court’s 
interpretations.99  President Franklin D. Roosevelt famously considered altering 
the composition of the Supreme Court because it failed to affirm components of 
his New Deal platform.100  More recently, controversies involving public school 
education and abortion have caused commentators to criticize the Court’s 
undemocratic nature.101 
As discussed above, Hamilton’s argument in favor of an independent judiciary 
turns in part on the idea that the public has the least to fear from a Court that 
“has no influence over either the sword or the purse.”102  However, being the 
least dangerous branch does not mean the Court poses no danger.  In order for 
the people to counter the danger that the Court poses, the people must have, and 
therefore expect, honest judicial opinions. 
A second argument might assert that because there is practically no recourse 
for the public to alter Supreme Court opinions interpreting the Constitution, the 
reasons provided by the Court and its Justices are of little import.  This argument 
turns on the difficulty involved in amending the Constitution.103  Of course 
difficult recourse is not the same as no recourse.  In fact, several Constitutional 
                                                 
 97. Brutus, Essay XV, in THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION DEBATES 304, 304–08 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) (1788); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, 
supra note 3, at 469–70 (Alexander Hamilton); From Thomas Jefferson to Edward Livingston, 25 
March 1825, U. VA. PRESS, http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=FOEA-
print-04-02-02-5077 (last visited Sep. 10, 2020) (explaining that the Supreme Court was “at first 
considered…the most harmless and helpless of all [the government’s] organs” but has developed 
to the point of “sapping and mining…the foundations of the [C]onstitution…”). 
 98. Gerard N. Magliocca, Preemptive Opinions: The Secret History of Worchester v. Georgia 
and Dred Scott, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 487, 549 (2002); John Yoo, Andrew Jackson and Presidential 
Power, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 521, 550–51 (2008).  In an address to Congress, President Jackson 
stated: “The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of 
Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both. The authority 
of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive 
when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their 
reasoning may deserve.”  Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION 
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1139 (James D. Richardson, III ed., 2d ed. 
1911). 
 99. Yoo, supra note 98, at 548–52. 
 100. William E. Leuchtenburg, When Franklin Roosevelt Clashed with the Supreme Court—
and Lost, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 2005), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/when-
franklin-roosevelt-clashed-with-the-supreme-court-and-lost-78497994/. 
 101. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. 
REV. 1019, 1022 (1992). 
 102. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 3, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 103. Erwin Chemerinsky, Amending The Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1561, 1565 (1998).  
See Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, supra note 67, at 1807–08. 
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amendments can be traced to a precipitating Supreme Court decision.104  For 
example, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, ratified in 1971, was at least partially 
a response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Oregon v. Mitchell.105  Even more 
recently, efforts have been made to amend the Constitution in response to 
Supreme Court decisions regarding abortion rights and flag burning.106  Truthful 
Supreme Court opinions are important for the public to determine if an 
amendment to the Constitution is the appropriate course to follow. 
C. Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Truthfulness 
Legitimacy has always been a concern of the Supreme Court.107  This concern 
has only deepened with time.108  Recent scholarship supports the intuitive 
connection between the Court’s legitimacy and the public’s perception of the 
honesty and character of the Court as reflected in its opinions.109 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, scholars focusing on the intersection between the 
law and psychology published the influential book Procedural Justice: A 
Psychological Analysis.110  In Procedural Justice, Professors Thibaut and 
                                                 
 104. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 1230 n.155. 
 105. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 134–35 (1970); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 
1230 n.155. 
 106. Lawrence K. Furbish, Constitutional Amendments to Reverse Supreme Court Decisions, 
CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH (Sept. 25, 1996), 
http://search.cga.state.ct.us/dlps96/Rpt/htm/96-R-1042.htm.  Since the Supreme Court decided Roe 
v. Wade, there have been numerous efforts to amend the Constitution to authorize states or the 
federal government to regulate abortions.  Id.  One proposal that would reverse Roe v. Wade, the 
Hatch-Eagleton proposal, actually made it to a Senate vote.  Steven V. Roberts, Full Senate Gets 
Abortion Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1983, at A12.  The Flag Desecration Amendments, which 
have been voted on twice by Congress, once in 1995 and again in 2006, were in response to the 
Supreme Court decisions Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) and United States v. Eichman, 496 
U.S. 310 (1990).  See Marni Goldberg, Flag Desecration Amendment Fails, CHI. TRIB. (June 28, 
2006), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-06-28/news/0606280130_1_american-flag-28th-
amendment-senate-on-tuesday-night; Robin Toner, Flag-Burning Amendment Fails in Senate, but 
Margin Narrows, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1995, at A1. 
 107. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 22 (2010).  
There, Justice Breyer states: 
Although Marbury gave the Court the power to refuse to apply an act of Congress on the 
ground that it violated the Constitution, the Court did not again exercise that power until 
its decision in the Dred Scott case more than fifty years later.  This hesitancy to find a 
federal statute unconstitutional, like Marshall’s strategic view of Marbury, suggests a 
Court deeply uncertain as to whether the president, the Congress, or the public itself 
would accept the Court’s views about the Constitution. 
Id. 
 108. Dion Farganis, Do Reasons Matter? The Impact of Opinion Content on Supreme Court 
Legitimacy, 65 POL. RES. Q. 206, 207 (2012).  Farganis notes that the United States Supreme Court 
mentioned concerns over institutional legitimacy only nine times before Brown v. Board of 
Education and seventy-one times between 1954 and 2009.  Id. 
 109. See id. at 213. 
 110. See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS (1975). 
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Walker examine how individuals and groups in the United States resolve 
conflicts.111 
Professor Tom Tyler, and others, have expanded Professors Thibaut and 
Walker’s work by examining the impact of procedural justice on public 
perceptions of institutional legitimacy.112  Professor Tyler has presented a body 
of scholarly work that supports the conclusion that institutional legitimacy is 
enhanced by perceptions of procedural justice.113  Honesty, or at least perceived 
honesty, is one of the attributes recognized by Professor Tyler’s research as 
leading citizens to see authority as fair.114  Thus, honesty is a component of 
procedural justice, and procedural justice is important to institutional 
legitimacy.115 
Professors Tyler and Yuen Huo have also identified a related psychological 
factor that impacts individual perceptions of institutional legitimacy called 
motive-based trust.116  Motive-based trust relates to the public’s confidence in 
the character of legal authority as inferred by “the actions” of that authority.117  
Thus, the public’s perception that the actions of the Court reflect good character 
also impacts the Court’s legitimacy.  Consistent with Professors Tyler and Huo’s 
work is the research of Professor Dion Farganis.118  Professor Farganis 
investigated and found evidence that the manner in which the Justices write their 
opinions impacts the public’s perception of the Court’s institutional 
legitimacy.119 
In addition to empirical research connecting the Court’s perceived legitimacy 
to the apparent trustworthiness of its opinions, members of the Court have 
recognized this connection.120  Justices on the Court have repeatedly commented 
on the importance of the public’s perception of its legitimacy.121  One famous 
example is included as part of the Court’s plurality opinion in Planned 
                                                 
 111. Id. at 1. 
 112. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 65, at 7–18 (discussing the impact of procedural justice on 
public perceptions of institutional legitimacy and arguing that people obey the law when they view 
the enforcement agency and the promulgation process as legitimate). 
 113. See generally id. 
 114. Id. at 7. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 58. 
 117. Id. at 61–67. 
 118. Compare id. with Farganis, supra note 108, at 207–14. 
 119. Farganis, supra note 108, at 206.  Professor Farganis concluded that “the message from 
the results of this study is clear: reasons matter, but not as much as some might think. Therefore, 
Justices who trim their rhetorical sails because they are concerned about public backlash may 
sometimes do this unnecessarily. Loyalty to the Court, while not entirely static, runs deep. Why the 
Justices seem to be unaware of this remains something of a mystery.”  Id. at 214. 
 120. Id. at 208 (“Justice Samuel Alito opined during his Supreme Court confirmation hearing, 
‘[T]he legitimacy of the Court would be undermined in any case if the Court made a decision based 
on its perception of public opinion.’”) (citation omitted). 
 121. Id. at 207. 
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Parenthood v. Casey.122  Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter (joined in part 
by Justices Blackmun and Stevens) jointly wrote the opinion of the Court which 
stated, “The Court’s power lies…in its legitimacy….”123 
Social psychology has found empirical support for the intuitive statement that 
judicial opinions demonstrating good character and honesty contribute to a 
perception of legitimacy.124  Further, the Court’s perceived legitimacy is, 
according to members of the Court, the primary source from which the Court 
derives its power.125 
It could be argued that trust and honesty are distinct concepts and one does 
not necessarily require the other.  Thus, the Court could retain its legitimacy so 
long as it is trusted, even if it is understood that, from time to time, Justices will 
bend the truth.  Virtually no one lives by a rule of complete and total honesty 
and yet each of us trusts others.126  Thus, we already trust people who we know 
are not always honest.  In fact, in some circumstances, we are likely to trust 
individuals more for their well-intended dishonesty.127  Further, honesty, as a 
stand-alone factor, is actually only a small part of procedural justice—a sub 
factor of a sub factor.  Honesty is also a small part of motive-based trust.128  It 
could be argued that the real emphasis in motive-based trust, as it relates to the 
Court, is on a belief that the Justices have a virtuous motive. 
A possible counter to the above argument is that, even though honesty and 
trust can be distinct factors, they nonetheless impact one another.129  Examples 
where we might still trust an individual who has made a false statement usually 
involve a person with whom we have a personal relationship.130  In that 
circumstance trust is based on a confidence that the person has our best interest 
at heart—thus a friend.  In circumstances where a Justice of the Supreme Court 
is explaining why a law is or is not Constitutional, trust is intimately linked to 
honesty, as other foundations for that trust are limited. 
Finally, it is easy to imagine circumstances where a person of character would 
be untruthful.  Imagine a friend who is the victim of domestic violence coming 
to your home and asking for help.  A few minutes after letting your friend into 
your home their abuser shows up and asks where the victim is.  There seems 
little doubt that lying to the abuser would be both prudent and reflect good 
character.  However, the motive of a Justice for being untruthful is much more 
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difficult to discern.  Among the various reasons why a Justice might be 
untruthful, there are just as many negative character-based reasons as positive 
ones.  Greed, arrogance, political gain—all could conceivably be motives.  The 
founders appear to have generally accepted the need for a separation of branches 
as a means to prevent the consolidation of power and a downward slide to 
tyranny.131  Is it not just as likely that the public would perceive dishonest 
Justices as seeking to enhance the Court’s power, as opposed to a positive 
character-based reason? 
D. The Moral Lie 
The final subcomponent of this Section regarding audience expectation and 
the Supreme Court focuses on the rich debate surrounding judicial candor and 
when, if ever, a Justice may lie.  Several scholars have written on judicial candor 
from a legal, ethical, moral, and practical perspective.132  As part of that 
discussion, some have suggested that it may be permissible for a judge to be 
untruthful.133  The most common position is that in exceedingly rare 
circumstances, a judge may deviate from the standards of judicial candor when 
morality demands an untruthful opinion.134  Although the focus of this Essay is 
on the need for apparent honesty in Supreme Court opinions as a tool of 
persuasion, I feel compelled to discuss the issue of moral lies because it clarifies 
my theory of apparent honesty. 
Several well-respected scholars have offered principled arguments in favor of 
the moral lie exception.  Professor Richard Fallon has written two articles that 
touch on the subject.135  The first article discusses the various forms of 
legitimacy that are related to the United States Supreme Court.136  The forms of 
legitimacy Professor Fallon identifies are moral, legal, and sociological.137  
Professor Fallon explains his belief that a Supreme Court decision can be 
morally legitimate and legally illegitimate.138  Professor Fallon’s other article139 
is a deep dive into the nuances of judicial candor—noting that judicial candor is 
best understood as running along a spectrum with ideal candor at one end and 
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minimally obligatory candor at the other.140  Professor Fallon presents a clear 
and persuasive argument favoring judicial candor but allows for the possibility 
of exceedingly rare circumstances where, on moral grounds, the obligation to 
candor may yield.141  Professor David Shapiro, in his influential article, In 
Defense of Judicial Candor, also accepted that there might be an obligation to 
lie in the extremely rare circumstance where there is a “conflict between legal 
and moral right.”142  Professor Idleman’s A Prudential Theory of Judicial 
Candor discusses several reasons for deviating from the pro-candor rule, 
including moral necessity.143  Other authors like Professor Ronald Dworkin have 
written that when a conflict arises where doing what is legally correct is morally 
wrong, a judge is permitted to lie.144 
It is easy to see how the moral lie argument is appealing.  Professor Fallon 
describes the following: 
Real examples may include criminal cases involving African 
American defendants, some subject to the death penalty, that came to 
the Supreme Court from what the Justices reasonably could have 
supposed to be racially biased state courts during the Jim Crow era.  In 
a number of these cases, the state courts invoked state law grounds—
which, as a technical matter, would ordinarily lie beyond the capacity 
of the Supreme Court to review—to refuse even to adjudicate the 
claims of federal right that the defendants presented.145 
When examining such cases like Brown v. Mississippi,146 where the 
governmental injustice is appalling, the Court’s action is wholly correct.  
Further, it is easy to imagine that if Justices of the Supreme Court had only done 
what was morally right, decisions like Dred Scott,147 Plessy,148 and Korematsu149 
would have never been written.  What is more difficult to understand is why 
Justices should cloak their moral decisions in a deceptive shroud of false 
reasoning.  If justice can be achieved by a lie, can it not also be achieved through 
the truth? 
It is possible that there is really no disagreement between my position and 
authors describing a moral lie.  The various authors discussing the exceptional 
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circumstance of a moral lie may really only be describing the circumstance 
where a judge or justice does not have a clearly established legal foundation to 
support their exercise of power.  Thus, if a Justice must exercise power where 
they traditionally would not have power, the exercise of that power is a form of 
a lie.  I would not consider this to be a lie unless the justice or judge claimed a 
power they did not believe existed.150  Thus, a Justice could explain that although 
the Court traditionally would not have the power to resolve the issue at hand, 
under the extraordinary circumstances of the particular case it does have the 
power. 
It could be argued that the moral lie justification is more appropriately applied 
to judges rather than Justices.151  Obviously if a trial judge or intermediate 
appellate judge encounters a situation where the legally correct action is at odds 
with morality and the judge does the morally right thing and states it, that action 
can be appealed.152  This problem is not present when the opinion is issued by a 
Supreme Court Justice.  No appellate body exists beyond the Supreme Court, 
and absent a refusal on the part of the Executive or state governments to follow 
the Court’s judgment, the decision would have the same effect whether the 
rationale offered was honest or not.  Thus, a Supreme Court Justice has even less 
justification for a moral lie than a trial or intermediate judge. 
Some have suggested that the moral lie is necessary to defend aspects of the 
legitimacy of the Court while also vindicating the values at play in a particular 
case.153  However, it could be argued that such an approach actually endangers 
the Court’s legitimacy in situations where the public perceives that the Court 
exceeded its authority, and lied about it.  Moreover, difficult questions that exist 
at the intersection between law and morality would seem to be exactly the sort 
of occasion where honesty would be most critical.  Although Justices on the 
Supreme Court can rightly claim a unique and expert skill when addressing 
questions of law, they have no greater entitlement to resolving questions of 
morality than any other citizen.  If the Justices of the Court were to encounter a 
situation where morality and not the law were dictating the outcome of the case, 
their obligation to sincere candor is heightened, not diminished. 
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In recent years, two Supreme Court opinions have rejected the idea that the 
Justices of the Court are permitted to impose their sense of morality through 
their decisions.154  In Casey, the Court stated, “Some of us as individuals find 
abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot 
control our decision.  Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate 
our own moral code.”155  Justice Kennedy writing for the majority in Lawrence 
v. Texas addressing an anti-sodomy law cited to Casey and wrote, “The issue is 
whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on 
the whole society through operation of the criminal law.”156  These opinions 
seem to foreclose the argument that a Justice should be permitted to lie on moral 
grounds. 
I agree there may be occasions where the demands of morality are in conflict 
with the law and Justices on the Supreme Court feel compelled to act in 
conformity with morality.  I am not convinced that such actions will require 
dishonesty. 
III. Credibility Choke Points 
Even when Justices strive to provide honest, practical, and competent 
opinions they may face accusations that they have not been candid.  Justice 
Owen Roberts was reportedly deeply hurt by the rumor that he had switched his 
vote in the 1937 case of West Coast Hotel v. Parrish157 for political rather than 
judicial reasons.158  For decades since, it has been debated whether Roberts 
switched his vote due to external political pressure or an internal jurisprudential 
shift in his beliefs.159  I suggest part of this debate was exacerbated by the fact 
that Justice Roberts failed to negotiate two of at least three common credibility 
choke points. 
Credibility choke points, as I call them, are points in judicial opinions, 
particularly Supreme Court opinions, where there is a heightened danger of 
appearing untruthful.  These are opinions or passages in opinions, where the 
danger of appearing dishonest is high, and so special care needs to be taken to 
assure readers that the Justice is being candid and sincere.  I suggest at least three 
choke points: questions involving stare decisis, highly politicized cases, and 
confronting changes in a Justice’s past opinions.  Although I will be addressing 
each of these choke points separately, it is not uncommon for a Justice to face 
several choke points in a single opinion. 
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A. Stare Decisis: What Does that Case Really Say? 
One of the most common allegations directed against controversial opinions 
is that the author has violated the doctrine of stare decisis.160  This allegation can 
occur because critics believe the author of an opinion has refused to follow 
precedent, has misread (purposely or not) the precedent, or has misapplied the 
precedent. 
Stare decisis is a short-hand method of capturing the idea contained in the 
longer Latin phrase “stare decisis et non quieta movere,” which translates to 
“stand by the decision and do not disturb what is settled.”161  The doctrine of 
stare decisis is one of the theories of judicial interpretation upon which judges 
across the jurisprudential spectrum can generally agree.162  Justices with as wide 
and varied judicial philosophies as Justice Antonin Scalia163 and Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg164 agree that stare decisis is an important doctrine, and it is 
common for Justices to claim that stare decisis supports the outcome they 
advocate.165  It is particularly interesting when both sides argue theirs is the 
position that is true to the doctrine of stare decisis.166  Despite claims that stare 
decisis supports an opinion, some of these arguments just do not appear fully 
honest when subjected to close scrutiny.  When these accounts fall apart, it often 
leaves the appearance of a dishonest assessment of the prior case law.  I have 
chosen to address two majority opinions where the Justices’ approach to stare 
decisis has been called into question.  These cases are Dickerson v. United 
States167 and Arizona v. Gant.168 
1. Dickerson v. United States: Confronting the Miranda 
Paradox169 
Dickerson v. United States has the distinct air of a decision where, over time, 
the Supreme Court backed itself into an untenable position that endangered the 
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Miranda line of cases.  As a result, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was the author 
of two of the opinions that created the problem, ironically wrote the opinion that 
saved the Miranda doctrine. 
Dickerson v. United States brought to a head a clash between the Supreme 
Court and Congress that had been brewing for over thirty years.170  Prior to 
Dickerson, in 1966, the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona, where the 
Court announced that police officers must advise suspects of certain rights when 
being questioned in police dominated custodial settings.171  Miranda rights, as 
they came to be called, are now well known by the public based, at least in part, 
on depictions in popular television and movies.  At the time of the decision, 
many argued that the Court had overstepped and in an effort to legislatively 
overturn Miranda, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a), which states, “[A] 
confession…shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given.”172 
Despite Congress’s actions, it seemed that Miranda would go undisturbed, as 
the decision itself was generally understood to conclude that the Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution demanded Miranda warnings, thus placing the 
matter beyond Congress’s control.173  Despite what seemed like a clear 
constitutional rule, the Supreme Court in the 1970’s began chipping away at the 
intellectual underpinnings of the Miranda case.  In decisions like Michigan v. 
Tucker,174 New York v. Quarles,175 and Oregon v. Elstad,176 a majority of the 
Supreme Court referred to the requirement to give Miranda warnings as a 
prophylactic rule.177  Thus, in each of these decisions, the Court found an officer 
could violate the holding in Miranda by failing to give the prescribed warnings 
before conducting a police-dominated custodial interrogation, without violating 
the Fifth Amendment.178  These decisions set up the controversy in Dickerson: 
if failing to give Miranda warnings did not violate the Fifth Amendment and 
thus the Constitution, how was the Court able to apply the rule to the states and 
ignore Congress’s action?179 
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Dickerson contained the right mix of facts and circumstances to bring the 
various Miranda based decisions and 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) into clear conflict.  In 
Dickerson, after a bank robbery, an eye witness told the FBI the license number 
of the getaway car.180  The car was registered to the defendant.181  The FBI asked 
the defendant to come into a field office for an interview, which he did.182  
During the interview, agents secured a search warrant and told Mr. Dickerson 
they were about to search his apartment.183  Mr. Dickerson then made a statement 
while in FBI custody without receiving Miranda warnings.184  After being 
indicted, Mr. Dickerson’s lawyer sought to suppress the statement as being taken 
in violation of the defendant’s Miranda rights.185  The trial court ruled that the 
statement was inadmissible but the evidence that had been derived from the 
unwarned statement was admissible because the statement was voluntarily 
given.186  As a result of the trial court’s ruling, the Government took an 
interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit.187  The Fourth Circuit agreed with the factual findings of the lower court 
but still reversed.188  The Fourth Circuit held that because Dickerson’s 
confession was voluntary it was admissible according to 18 U.S.C. § 3501.189  
The Circuit Court stated that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and not Miranda, “governe[d] 
the admissibility of [all] confessions in federal court” (in-custody or not).190 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, observed, “This case…turns 
on whether the Miranda Court announced a constitutional rule or merely 
exercised its supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of 
congressional direction.”191  He went on to cite two primary arguments for why 
Miranda was a constitutional decision.  First, the only way that the Miranda 
Court could apply its decision to the states would be if the decision was a 
constitutional interpretation.192  Second, the Miranda Court clearly stated the 
opinion was a constitutional decision.193  Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to 
address some of the counter arguments to the majority’s opinion. 
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist responded to several of the arguments 
against the majority opinion, he failed actually to respond to the central question 
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of the case.  The Chief Justice claims that “[t]he Court of Appeals also relied on 
the fact that we have, after our Miranda decision, made exceptions from its rule 
in cases such as New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649…(1984), and Harris v. New 
York, 401 U.S. 222…(1971).”194  In response, the majority states, “These 
decisions illustrate the principle—not that Miranda is not a constitutional rule—
but that no constitutional rule is immutable.”195  Next, the Chief Justice states, 
“The Court of Appeals also noted that in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 
298…(1985), we stated that ‘[t]he Miranda exclusionary rule…serves the Fifth 
Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.’”196  In 
response to this point, the majority explains that the Court’s refusal to extend the 
Fourth Amendment fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to Miranda violations 
does not establish that Miranda was not a constitutional rule.197  Finally, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist frames Justice Scalia’s dissent as arguing “that it is judicial 
overreaching for this Court to hold § 3501 unconstitutional unless we hold that 
the Miranda warnings are required by the Constitution, in the sense that nothing 
else will suffice to satisfy constitutional requirements.”198  In response to the 
argument thus framed, the Chief Justice states, “[W]e need not go farther than 
Miranda to decide this case.” 199 
Chief Justice Rehnquist finishes the majority opinion by asserting that stare 
decisis weighed heavily in favor of maintaining the Miranda warnings as they 
had become part of police procedure throughout the country.200  There is some 
irony in Justice Rehnquist’s appeal to stare decisis.  Michigan v. Tucker, 
authored by Justice Rehnquist, is the first case in which a majority of the 
Supreme Court substantially relied on the assertion that Miranda warnings were 
“prophylactic” to resolve the admissibility of a defendant’s statement.201  Thus, 
it was Michigan v. Tucker that arguably violated the doctrine of stare decisis, 
and then later opinions that perpetuated the break begun in Tucker.  Justice 
Douglas dissented in Tucker noting, “The Court is not free to prescribe preferred 
modes of interrogation absent a constitutional basis.  We held the ‘requirement 
of warnings and waiver of rights [to be] fundamental with respect to the Fifth 
Amendment privilege,’…and without so holding we would have been powerless 
to reverse Miranda’s conviction.”202  Thus, Justice Douglas asserted the majority 
in Tucker failed to follow the doctrine established in Miranda (and thereby 
violated stare decisis), and Justice Douglas pointed out the theoretical challenge 
to the Miranda prophylactic rule that would ultimately lead to the Dickerson 
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opinion.  Despite the arguable logical impossibility of the Court’s 
post-Tucker/Miranda jurisprudence, by the time the Court ultimately confronted 
the issue, the Dickerson majority concluded that the Miranda decision was too 
ingrained in American legal culture to be abandoned.203 
It seems difficult to deny that Miranda warnings had become part of American 
legal culture, but had the exceptions?  Would it have not been more consistent 
with stare decisis to recognize that the Miranda decision, as it was written before 
Tucker, was deserving of greater precedential value?  Instead, the Court arguably 
maintained a paradoxical rule where there can be a violation of a constitutional 
rule that does not violate the Constitution. 
2. Arizona v. Gant: Preservation of Precedent in Name Only204 
Arizona v. Gant dealt with the difficult question of how the search incident to 
a lawful arrest doctrine should be applied to recent occupants of a vehicle.  The 
Court had been attempting to resolve this issue for over twenty years prior to the 
Gant decision.  First in New York v. Belton205 and then again in Thornton v. 
United States,206 the Court issued opinions with a bright-line rule.  The general 
understanding of the Belton/Thornton rule was that officers were permitted, as 
an incident to a lawful arrest of a recent occupant of a vehicle, to search the 
passenger compartment of the vehicle.207  This rule did not require 
individualized suspicion beyond the probable cause necessary for the arrest, and 
it was justified by the need to ensure officer safety and to prevent the destruction 
or concealment of evidence.208  The facts of the Belton and Thornton cases are 
important to analyzing how the majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, 
addresses stare decisis in Gant. 
In Belton, an officer pulled a car over for speeding and discovered four men 
inside.209  The officer observed that none of the men were on the registration of 
the car, and there was the smell of burnt marijuana coming from the car.210  The 
officer ordered the men out of the car and placed them under arrest.211  The men 
were not handcuffed or placed in a police vehicle, but instead were required to 
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sit in the median of the highway.212  The officer searched the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle and discovered the defendant’s leather coat and 
drugs in one of its pockets.213  The Supreme Court concluded that a bright and 
clear rule was necessary.214  Thus, the Court ruled the search was permissible as 
an incident to arrest.  The majority went further and stated, “[W]e hold that when 
a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, 
he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger 
compartment of that automobile.”215  Although Justice Stevens concurred in the 
Belton judgment, he wrote very little to explain his position.216 
In Thornton, an officer’s suspicions were aroused when the defendant sought 
to avoid driving his car near the officer.217  The officer ran the defendant’s 
license plate and discovered the license plate did not match the defendant’s 
vehicle.218  Next, the officer followed the defendant and observed him pull into 
a parking lot and get out of his car.219  The officer drove up behind the 
defendant’s car, got out of his vehicle, and accosted the defendant.220  The officer 
asked the defendant if he could pat him down, and the defendant agreed.221  
When the officer felt a bulge in the defendant’s clothing, the officer asked if the 
defendant was carrying any illegal drugs on his person, and the defendant said 
yes.222  The officer secured the drugs, arrested the defendant, placed him in the 
back of the police car, and conducted a search of the defendant’s vehicle.223  The 
search revealed a gun.224  Thornton was prosecuted for possession of narcotics 
with the intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug 
trafficking, and being a felon in possession of the firearm.225  The defendant 
sought to suppress the gun, claiming a violation of the Fourth Amendment.226  
The trial court denied the motion, relying on Belton, and the Fourth Circuit 
upheld the finding.227  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the 
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lower court’s holding.228  Justice Stevens dissented in Thornton, asserting that 
the expansion of the Belton rule was unnecessary and unjustified.229 
In Gant, police arrested the defendant for driving on a suspended license.230  
After arresting him, police placed Mr. Gant in handcuffs and put him in the back 
seat of a police car.231  Next, police conducted a search of the passenger 
compartment of Mr. Gant’s car where they found cocaine and a gun.232  Mr. Gant 
was charged with driving on a suspended license and possession of drug 
paraphernalia and a narcotic drug for sale.233  Mr. Gant challenged the search on 
Fourth Amendment grounds.234  The trial court denied Mr. Gant’s challenge but 
the Arizona appellate court and Arizona Supreme Court disagreed.235  According 
to the Arizona Supreme Court, the police violated Mr. Gant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.236  The court found that the search incident to arrest doctrine 
did not apply in this instance because at the time of the search, Mr. Gant was no 
longer able to access the passenger compartment and so it was no longer a search 
incident to arrest.237 
Justice Stevens, writing for a five-Justice majority, crafted a new approach to 
searches incident to the arrest of a recent occupant of a vehicle.  Under this new 
approach, an officer can search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest 
under two circumstances: (1) if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment at the time of the search, or (2) if there is reason to 
believe evidence of the crime of arrest can be found in the vehicle.238  Applying 
this approach, the majority concluded that Mr. Gant was not within reaching 
distance of the passenger compartment of the car at the time of the search 
because he was handcuffed in the back of a locked police car.  Nor was there 
reason to believe evidence of the crime Gant was arrested for, driving on a 
suspended license, would be found in the car.239 
Although many believed Gant overruled Belton and Thornton, Justice Stevens 
insisted that it did not.240  In his opinion, Justice Stevens asserts that the facts of 
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Gant are clearly distinguishable from Belton or Thornton.241  Regarding Belton, 
the defendants were arrested but not handcuffed or in a police vehicle, and there 
was only one officer and four suspects.242  Justice Stevens distinguishes 
Thornton by stating nothing more than “the petitioner [in Thornton] was arrested 
for a drug offense.”243  He also wrote, “We have never relied on stare decisis to 
justify the continuance of an unconstitutional police practice.”244 
Five Justices on the Court disagreed with the majority regarding whether Gant 
substantially overruled the Belton/Thornton rule.245  The conclusion that Gant 
overruled the Belton/Thornton rule seems strong.  First, the Belton/Thornton 
rule, where an officer is always able to search the passenger compartment of the 
vehicle of a recently arrested occupant, had been so widely accepted that it was 
being taught at police academies.246  Also, numerous lower courts had 
interpreted Belton and Thornton this way.  Even the Arizona Supreme Court 
stated, “We are aware that most other courts presented with similar factual 
situations have found Belton and Thornton dispositive of the question whether a 
search like the one at issue was incident to arrest.”247  Finally, the facts in the 
Thornton case were strikingly similar to the Gant case, at least with regard to 
when the search was conducted by the officers. 
It is unclear from Justice Stevens’ opinion why he shied away from the 
conclusion that Gant overruled Belton and Thornton.248  Given that Justice 
Stevens dissented in Thornton and only concurred in Belton, he seems to have 
disagreed with the Belton/Thornton approach from the beginning.  Further, a 
strong argument exists that Justice Stevens’ opinion is far more in line with the 
Court’s broader doctrine dealing with searches incident to arrest.  In fact, much 
of the criticism of the Belton/Thornton cases asserted that the Court’s approach 
had strayed from the doctrinal underpinnings of the search incident to an arrest 
rule.  Justice Scalia noted that such an approach imagines a “mythical arrestee 
‘possessed of the skill of Houdini and the strength of Hercules.’”249 
The confusion over why Justice Stevens insisted that Gant did not overrule 
Belton and Thornton is deepened by his response to Justice Alito’s dissent.  
Justice Stevens begins by stating that stare decisis is not a reason to continue to 
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permit a police practice that violates the Constitution.250  This argument only 
makes sense if Belton and Thornton were unconstitutional and were now being 
overruled.  Next, Justice Stevens claims that overruling Belton and Thornton is 
unnecessary because the two cases are easily distinguished from Gant.251  
Although Belton does contain a number of important factual distinctions from 
Gant, Thornton does not.  In fact, Justice Stevens says nothing more to 
distinguish Thornton from Gant than the defendant in Thornton was arrested for 
a drug charge.  This distinction is the weakest portion of Justice Stevens’ 
opinion. 
Readers are left to wonder why Justice Stevens refused to just write that the 
Court was overruling the Belton/Thornton rule.  At least two authors have 
accused the majority opinion of being “disingenuous[].”252  A number of 
possibilities exist besides dishonesty.  Perhaps Justice Stevens was concerned 
about the second and third order effects such a wholesale action might have such 
that the doctrine in Gant would inadvertently impact other aspects of the search 
incident to arrest doctrine.  Perhaps Justice Stevens was persuaded by the 
Arizona Supreme Court’s argument that although the facts in the Thornton case 
were similar to the Gant case, the legal question the Court resolved in Thornton 
was not similar.  The Arizona Supreme Court argued that the Thornton decision 
only resolved whether the search incident to arrest doctrine dealing with 
automobiles could be applied where the police encounter began after the suspect 
exited the vehicle.253  Justice Stevens’ election to not explain more clearly why 
the Gant decision was not overruling Belton or at least Thornton, raises 
unnecessary questions about an opinion which appears to be a return to a more 
sound approach. 
B. Political Cases: The Kobayashi Maru254 
When the Supreme Court confronts a highly politicized case, it can seem like 
a no-win situation for the Justices.  Recent decisions like Bush v. Gore and the 
two decisions surrounding the Affordable Care Act seem to demonstrate this as 
fact.255  Critical to the Court’s credibility is the perception that it is a neutral, 
                                                 
 250. Gant, 556 U.S. at 348. 
 251. Id. at 348. 
 252. Andrew Fois & Lauren Simmons, Thomas Jefferson’s Carriage: Arizona v. Gant’s 
Assault on the Belton Doctrine, 5 CRIM. L. BRIEF 4, 21 (2009). 
 253. Gant, 556 U.S. at 335–36. 
 254. Janet Stemwedel, The Philosophy of Star Trek: The Kobayashi Maru, No-Win Scenarios, 
And Ethical Leadership, FORBES (August 23, 2015 10:15 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetstemwedel/2015/08/23/the-philosophy-of-star-trek-the-
kobayashi-maru-no-win-scenarios-and-ethical-leadership/#30f032535f48 (explaining that 
Kobayashi Maru is a training exercise in the fictional Star Trek universe designed to test the 
character of Starfleet Academy cadets in a no-win scenario). 
 255. See generally King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
278 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 69.2:1 
non-political branch of government.256  It is clear that the Justices on the Court 
believe the public’s perception of political neutrality is important.257  Nowhere 
is that perception more challenged than when the Court must decide a highly 
publicized political question.  One recent example of such a case is Bush v. 
Gore.258 
1. Bush v. Gore: Deciding the Presidency 
Never before had the United States Supreme Court effectively resolved a 
presidential election.259  It is difficult to imagine a more politicized decision of 
the Court.  Making matters more challenging was the fact that the case involved 
a nuanced interpretation of state voting statutes and detailed factual questions 
like whether an indented ballot should count as a cast vote or if the voter must 
actually perforate the ballot.260  Additionally, the Court and the state of Florida 
were facing what seemed like an iron clad deadline.261  The country held its 
breath and waited for an outcome—of course the decision is well known.  The 
Florida recount was stopped, and George W. Bush became President.262 
Before the dust settled on the Supreme Court’s opinion, a new vote count 
began, but this count only involved nine ballots.  The most controversial part of 
the Bush v. Gore decision was a 5–4 per curium opinion.263  The five Justices in 
the majority were Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, 
Justice Kennedy, and Justice O’Connor.264  All five members of the majority 
who paved the way for the Republican nominee to become the President had 
also been appointed by Republican presidents.265 
Given the split of the Court and the highly political nature of the controversy, 
special care was needed in explaining the majority opinion.  Unfortunately, 
many perceived the explanation as lacking.266  The per curium opinion 
explained, “The recount process, in its features here described, is inconsistent 
                                                 
 256. Carson Holloway, John Roberts: A Political Judge?, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 2, 2019), 
https://www.heritage.org/node/14335069/print-display. 
 257. Bush, 531 U.S. at 111; Iuliano, supra note 75, at 917. 
 258. Bush, 531 U.S. at 111. 
 259. Peter M. Shane, Policy at the Intersection of Law and Politics: Panel One: When Inter-
Branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, “Orderly Shutdowns,” Presidential 
Impeachments, and Judicial “Coups”, 12 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 503, 536 (2003). 
 260. Bush, 531 U.S. at 103–06. 
 261. Id. at 122 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 262. Id. at 100–01, 110–11. 
 263. Id. at 100. 
 264. Id. at 99. 
 265. See Jess Bravin et al., Bush v. Gore Has Personal Angle for Some Supreme Court 
Justices,  WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2000 12:08 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB976572470116168521. 
 266. Bush, 531 U.S. at 128–29 (Stevens, J., dissenting); RONALD DWORKIN, A BADLY 
FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 9 (2002). 
2020] The Value of Apparent Honesty in Supreme Court Opinions 279 
with the minimum procedures necessary to protect the fundamental right of each 
voter in the special instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a single 
state judicial officer.”267  Based on the above findings, the majority concluded 
that the current procedure violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.268  This conclusion was not overwhelmingly controversial.  Seven 
of the Justices on the Court believed the recount procedures were inconsistent 
with Equal Protection.269 
The most controversial aspect of the opinion was the decision to stop the 
recount rather than remanding the case to the Florida State Supreme Court with 
instructions to correct the procedures.270  The question of whether the state of 
Florida could reorder its recount procedures in time to meet state and federal 
statutory deadlines for certifying election results was in doubt.271  However, not 
permitting Florida to try gave the per curium decision the air of corruption.272 
Additionally, the majority opinion did little to refute the arguments presented 
by the four dissenting Justices who each wrote opinions.273  The dissenting 
Justices claimed that the majority failed to give the usual deference to the Florida 
State Supreme Court in matters involving the interpretation of Florida law.274  
Also, it was asserted that the majority should not have stopped earlier efforts to 
conduct a recount, nor should it stop potential future efforts.275  Finally, the 
majority was alleged to have abandoned its usual restraint, particularly in matters 
involving political questions.276 
In response to the dissenting opinions, the majority dedicated approximately 
two paragraphs.  The paragraphs stated: 
Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are constitutional problems 
with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court that demand a 
remedy. See post, at 134 (SOUTER, J., dissenting); post, at 145-146 
(BREYER, J., dissenting). The only disagreement is as to the remedy. 
Because the Florida Supreme Court has said that the Florida 
Legislature intended to obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5, 
JUSTICE BREYER’S proposed remedy-remanding to the Florida 
Supreme Court for its ordering of a constitutionally proper contest 
until December 18-contemplates action in violation of the Florida 
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Election Code, and hence could not be part of an “appropriate” order 
authorized by Fla. Stat. Ann. § 102.168(8) (Supp. 2001). 
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than 
are the members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of 
the Constitution’s design to leave the selection of the President to the 
people, through their legislatures, and to the political sphere.  When 
contending parties invoke the process of the courts, however, it 
becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve the federal and 
constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to confront.277 
Despite lengthy dissenting opinions, the majority elected to offer little response 
to the criticism. 
Given the composition of the majority, the Justices must have anticipated the 
reaction to their opinion.278  Although the majority explained the strongest part 
of its argument clearly—how the current Florida recount rules violated Equal 
Protection—it did little to explain why it did not give the state of Florida a 
chance to try and correct the deficiency.279  Further, the majority offered little 
response to the more elaborate arguments presented by the dissenting Justices, 
thereby leaving the potential impression that the majority had no adequate reply.  
The weakness in the majority opinion is made more apparent by the relative 
strength of the three-Justice concurrence.280  The concurrence dedicates more 
energy to responding to the dissents and is viewed by some as more 
persuasive.281 
Political cases demand a particular sensitivity by the Court to the public’s 
concern regarding its status as a neutral non-political body.282  This need is all 
the greater given the continuing politicization of the appointment process—
making the Justices on the Court appear more and more like political figures.  
Given this backdrop, more explanation in a political case is preferred to less.  
The public needs a thorough explanation of why the majority is correct, and clear 
reasoning that provides some assurance that facts and law, rather than politics, 
dictated the outcome.  Further, a full confrontation of dissenting opinions is 
necessary to dispel the potential appearance that the majority did not respond 
because it could not. 
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C. When Minds Change 
The philosopher and author C.S. Lewis once explained that sometimes the 
shortest path to a destination is backward.283  This seemingly counterintuitive 
statement applies when a traveler discovers they have gone in the wrong 
direction.  So too with courts and judges.  However, unlike a traveler who has to 
very visibly and obviously change directions, judges and courts sometimes seem 
to try and change direction without declaring the old path was wrong.  Although 
a written “about face” might not be as obvious as a traveler turning around and 
walking back the way they came, it is sometimes nearly as obvious.  However, 
when Justices of the Supreme Court change jurisprudential directions or seek to 
change the Court’s direction, particularly when it comes to positions they 
themselves have taken in the past, an explanation is necessary if they are not to 
appear dishonest.  Below are two cases to illustrate this point.  The first focuses 
on what is likely the most well-known apparent “switch” in Supreme Court 
history: Justice Owen Roberts’ decision to join the majority opinion in West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,284 and a lesser known opinion from Justice Stevens 
in Illinois v. Caballes.285  Both opinions demonstrate an apparent change in 
position without an explanation. 
1. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish: A Historic Switch 
Dubbed “the switch in time that saved the nine,”286 West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish remains controversial today, more than eighty years after the decision 
was published.  Some claim Justice Roberts’ vote was merely the result of an 
evolving view toward the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause.287  
Others assert Justice Roberts’ earlier votes were influenced by his own 
aspirations to the Republican Party’s nomination to the presidency in 1936—
and after that possibility closed—his vote changed.288  Others still suggest that 
factors outside the Court, including mounting public pressure, had an 
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influence.289  The fact that this debate continues demonstrates that there was a 
need for an explanation. 
The Parrish case came on the heels of a tumultuous period in the Court’s 
history.  Beginning in 1935 and continuing into 1936, the Court struck down 
significant elements of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, prompting one 
columnist to quip that the Court’s New Deal jurisprudence resembled the end of 
a Shakespearian tragedy.290 
One of the Justices who appeared to vote consistently (albeit not unerringly) 
against the New Deal programs was Justice Owen Roberts.291  In 1936, the Court 
decided the case of Morehead v. New York.292  In Morehead, the Court upheld a 
lower court ruling that New York’s minimum wage law affecting women was 
unconstitutional because it violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.293  Through Morehead, the Court upheld an earlier decision regarding 
the constitutionality of minimum wage laws, Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.294  
Justice Roberts voted with the majority in Morehead, invalidating the minimum 
wage law in New York.295  In 1937, the Court decided Parrish, which upheld a 
minimum wage statute directed at women.296  Justice Roberts joined the 
majority.297  Thus, the switch occurred. 
Because Justice Roberts did not write an opinion in Morehead or Parrish, we 
do not have his written opinion explaining why he changed his vote.  
Additionally, after retiring, Justice Roberts destroyed his legal notes.298  In a 
1955 law review tribute to the recently deceased Justice Roberts, Justice 
Frankfurter published the contents of a memorandum from Justice Roberts 
explaining his change of position.299  In the 1945 memorandum, Justice Roberts 
asserted that the Court in Morehead was not asked to reconsider the earlier 
Adkins precedent.300  Thus, the Court was only asked to decide if the Morehead 
and Adkins cases could be distinguished, and, if so, to what effect.301  Justice 
Roberts felt the cases could not be distinguished and so voted to uphold the lower 
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court’s ruling striking down the minimum wage law.302  According to Justice 
Roberts, his vote changed in Parrish because the Court was asked to reconsider 
Adkins, which he believed was wrongly decided.303 
Scholars have debated Justice Roberts’ explanation.  Some have claimed his 
explanation makes sense and is consistent with his behavior as a jurist.304  Others 
have argued that Justice Frankfurter’s initial reaction to Justice Roberts’ switch 
was accurate—pure politics.305  At least one author has challenged whether 
Justice Roberts even wrote the memorandum to Justice Frankfurter.306 
Regardless of why Justice Roberts voted as he did in Morehead and Parrish—
a reason was needed.  Parrish was a dramatic turning point for the Court.  After 
Parrish, there was a steady flow of economic legislation that was held 
constitutional, which before Parrish, would likely have been struck down.307  
Justice Roberts’ vote was widely believed to be in response to President 
Roosevelt’s proposal to enlarge the Supreme Court in order to include more 
liberal voices.308  Justice Frankfurter rejected this argument claiming that Justice 
Roberts’ vote in W.H.H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews (which predated President 
Roosevelt’s announcement regarding expanding the Supreme Court) clearly 
foreshadowed Roberts’ vote in Parrish.309  Other scholars  have concurred with 
Justice Frankfurter, asserting that Justice Roberts cast his decisive vote in 
conference, six weeks before President Roosevelt announced his intention to 
expand the Supreme Court.310  However, when no reason is given, speculation 
will go where it will. 
2. Caballes v. Illinois: Binary Searches and Intimate Details 
In 2001, the Supreme Court decided Kyllo v. United States.311  In Kyllo, the 
Court confronted the question of how to apply the Fourth Amendment to an 
investigative technique the founders could not have imagined.312  In this case, 
government agents suspected the defendant of using his home to grow 
marijuana.313  As part of their investigation, the officers scanned Mr. Kyllo’s 
home with a thermal imaging device capable of showing the amount of heat 
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escaping from the house relative to others in the neighborhood.314  The agents 
were able to see that Mr. Kyllo’s garage and parts of his home were much hotter 
than other homes in the area, suggesting that Mr. Kyllo was using heat lamps in 
those parts of the house.315  Law enforcement used this and other information to 
secure a search warrant.316  The subsequent search revealed approximately 100 
marijuana plants.317  Mr. Kyllo objected at trial to the use of the thermal scanning 
device on Fourth Amendment grounds.318  His motion to suppress was denied, 
and he was convicted.319  The case eventually made it to the Supreme Court 
where Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, concluded that the use of the 
thermal scanning device in order to obtain a warrant was unconstitutional.320 
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia articulated a rule for countering the 
encroachment of technology on Fourth Amendment privacy.321  The new rule 
established that a Fourth Amendment search occurs when police use sense 
enhancing technology to gather information about a constitutionally protected 
area that could not have otherwise been secured without a physical trespass.322 
Kyllo was a 5–4 decision with Justice Stevens writing a vigorous dissent.323  
Among his objections to the majority’s opinion was that the Court’s new rule 
would limit the impact of the contraband exception to the Fourth Amendment, 
or the binary search doctrine.324  Under this doctrine any investigative technique 
that only reveals the presence or absence of contraband is not a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it does not reveal anything in which 
an individual would have a legitimate privacy interest.325  Justice Stevens stated: 
It is clear, however, that the category of “sense-enhancing technology” 
covered by the new rule…is far too broad.  It would, for example, 
embrace potential mechanical substitutes for dogs trained to react 
when they sniff narcotics.  But in United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 
707…(1983), we held that a dog sniff that “discloses only the presence 
or absence of narcotics” does “not constitute a ‘search’ within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment,” and it must follow that 
sense-enhancing equipment that identifies nothing but illegal activity 
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is not a search either.  Nevertheless, the use of such a device would be 
unconstitutional under the Court’s rule….326 
Approximately four years later, the Court issued its next case dealing with the 
dog sniffs, Illinois v. Caballes.327  In Caballes, a police officer pulled a car over 
for speeding.328  During the time it took the officer to process the ticket, another 
officer arrived with a narcotics dog.329  The officers walked the dog around Mr. 
Caballes’ car, and the dog alerted to the presence of drugs.330  A subsequent 
search revealed illegal drugs, and the defendant was arrested.331  At trial, the 
defense brought a motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the dog 
sniff, claiming the dog sniff was an illegal search.332 
Justice Stevens, writing for a majority of the Court, found the dog sniff was 
not a search.333  Further, so long as the use of the narcotics dog did not detain 
the defendant any longer than would have occurred as a result of issuing a ticket, 
no Fourth Amendment violation would occur.334  This finding was all that was 
necessary to answer the question before the Court, but Justice Stevens continued.  
In the second to last paragraph of his majority opinion, Justice Stevens 
explained: 
This conclusion is entirely consistent with our recent decision that the 
use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in 
a home constituted an unlawful search.  Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27…(2001).  Critical to that decision was the fact that the device 
was capable of detecting lawful activity—in that case, intimate details 
in a home, such as “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes 
her daily sauna and bath.”335 
Justice Stevens’ description of the impact of Kyllo on the binary search doctrine 
appeared to have made a 180-degree turn between his dissent in 2001 and his 
majority opinion in 2005.336  In 2001, the Kyllo majority opinion was too broad 
because it prevented the use of mechanical devices that only detect 
contraband.337  In 2005, the Kyllo decision only reached searches that could 
reveal lawful activity in the home.338 
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A reading of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Kyllo and Justice Stevens’ 
dissent make it appear that the Caballes description of Kyllo is not accurate.  
Justice Stevens appears to recast Kyllo as only reaching searches that reveal 
“intimate details in a home, such as ‘at what hour each night the lady of the 
house takes her daily sauna and bath.’”339  Such a recasting without further 
explanation simply does not withstand review.  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion 
did not draw a distinction between intimate and non-intimate details in the 
home.340  Justice Scalia explained that making such a distinction would be both 
wrong and impracticable.  The reason such a distinction would be wrong is 
because “[i]n the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because 
the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”341  Thus, the Kyllo 
decision was not linked to a distinction between intimate and non-intimate 
details or questions of daily sauna use. 
Was Justice Stevens dishonest in the second to last paragraph of Caballes?  
Possibly, but there is an obvious other possible explanation: he changed his 
mind.  Moreover, Justice Scalia might also have changed his mind.  During oral 
argument in Caballes, Justice Scalia asked: 
Why…are you sure that Kyllo…would have come out the same way if 
the only thing…that the imaging could pick out is not any of the other 
private activities in the home, but the only thing it could possibly 
discern is a dead body with a knife through the heart?  Are you sure 
the case would have come out the same way?  I’m not at all sure.342 
Although divining a Justice’s position by the questions they ask at oral argument 
is potentially unwise—this statement could have signaled a change or 
clarification of Justice Scalia’s view.343 
If Justice Stevens arrived at a different conclusion in Caballes than Kyllo, then 
an explanation was in order.  It did not need to be long—it could have simply 
been a footnote—but changes in views, especially as dramatic as that in 
Caballes, need an explanation or face the inference that one of the opinions was 
untruthful. 
D. Responding to Choke Points 
In each of the above examples, I have suggested ways that the Justices may 
have been able to enhance the apparent honesty of their opinions.  As I provide 
these suggestions, it is with one of President Theodore Roosevelt’s famous 
quotes in mind, “It is not the critic that counts…[t]he credit belongs to 
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the…[person] who is actually in the arena.”344  My discussion of credibility 
choke points and methods of enhancing apparent honesty is undertaken with an 
awareness of the enormous challenge facing Supreme Court Justices.  I am 
further aware of the ease of critique when given an abundance of time and the 
thoughtful examination of each Supreme Court opinion by hundreds of legal 
experts and scholars.  My suggestions seek only to offer approaches to consider 
when issuing opinions.  With all that said, I suggest three methods of enhancing 
apparent honesty: refutation of the strongest counter arguments, distinguishing 
doctrinal application, and explanation of changing positions. 
1. Refutation 
Refutation is a core element of persuasive communication and is frequently a 
part of Supreme Court opinions.  The refutation is necessary for an audience to 
understand why the author of an opinion is unpersuaded by counter arguments.  
In some cases, Justices engage in refutation but fail to respond to a central 
counter argument.  In these instances, a reader’s perception could be that the 
author of the opinion did not refute the counter position because they have no 
reply.  This in turn can leave the impression that the author of the opinion is 
merely seeking an outcome and is writing whatever they feel is necessary to 
achieve that end.  An example of this failure to refute can arguably be seen in 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Dickerson. 
The central counter-argument to the Dickerson majority opinion was that 
there cannot be a constitutional rule whose violation does not violate the 
Constitution.345  Thus, either Miranda was not a constitutional rule and § 3501 
should be effective, or Miranda was/is a constitutional decision, and the cases 
describing the Miranda warnings as prophylactic were in error.  In essence, 
Justice Douglas made this argument in his dissent to Michigan v. Tucker.346  This 
argument was central to the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that Miranda had been 
effectively overruled by § 3501 and to Justice Scalia’s dissent.  Nowhere in 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion does he explain how this contradiction is 
resolved. 
2. Distinguishing Doctrinal Application 
Distinguishing doctrinal application requires a Justice to examine their own 
perspectives on a particular doctrine and how they have articulated that approach 
in the past.  Justices’ opinions are generally more credible when they present a 
coherent judicial philosophy, at least with regard to particular doctrines.  When 
Justices stray from their stated approach, it often leads to allegations of 
outcome-directed opinion writing.  Justice Scalia, perhaps the most well-known 
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advocate of the originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, was 
frequently accused of failing to apply that interpretative approach evenly.347  
When a Justice uses a particular theory of constitutional interpretation in one 
way in a case and then ignores that theory in a different case or applies the theory 
differently, the apparent honesty of the opinion is reduced. 
One of the challenges to the majority opinion in Bush v. Gore was that several 
of the Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, Justice Scalia, and 
Justice Thomas) had voting histories that seemed inconsistent with the majority 
opinion.348  Thus, giving the appearance that these Justices voted as they did to 
achieve an end without really believing it was the proper vehicle.  Arguably, this 
perception was reinforced by the per curium’s effort to limit the precedential 
impact of its opinion by stating, “Our consideration is limited to the present 
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes 
generally presents many complexities.”349  This, coupled with other aspects of 
the decision, led to some of the most damning criticism of a Supreme Court 
decision in recent history. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist has also been criticized for his fluid views regarding 
stare decisis.350  One scholar asserted that the Chief Justice’s opinions in 
Dickerson and Casey “lack[ed] a principled distinction to be drawn between his 
opinions” regarding stare decisis.351  That scholar goes on to conclude, “[T]he 
distinction drawn [between the two cases] is not jurisprudential, but 
ideological.”352 
In each of the above cases, it is likely that the Justices involved would have 
had an explanation for why they applied the particular legal doctrines differently 
from one case to another.  However, because no explanation is provided, the 
Court’s audience is left to speculate.  Those members of the Court’s audience 
who are unhappy with the outcome are more likely to conclude the Justices are 
not being entirely honest. 
3. Explaining Apparent Changes in Jurisprudential Direction 
Apparent changes in jurisprudential direction do not necessarily mean a 
Justice has changed his or her opinion, only that it appears as if the Justice has 
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changed direction.  After the Parrish decision, Justice Roberts asserted that he 
had not changed his opinion from the Morehead decision.353  Rather, he claimed 
that because the questions asked were different, his answers were different.  In 
other circumstances, like Justice Stevens’ opinions in Kyllo and Caballes, where 
there is no explanation available, it seems more likely that the Justice changed 
his mind.  
An example of a Justice providing an explanation of an apparent change in 
jurisprudential direction can be seen in one of Justice Scalia’s opinions.  In his 
concurring opinion in Arizona v. Gant, Justice Scalia acknowledged his apparent 
jurisprudential change and why it was occurring. 
In Gant, which was described above, Justice Scalia joined the majority but 
also authored a concurring opinion.  In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens 
stated that a search incident to the lawful arrest of a recent occupant of a vehicle 
could occur in two circumstances: first, if the arrestee was within grabbing 
distance of the passenger compartment; and second, if there was a reasonable 
basis for believing evidence of the crime the suspect was arrested for could be 
found in the passenger compartment.354  Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion 
explained why he had joined the majority despite having written in an earlier 
decision, United States v. Thornton, that the grabbing distance justification for 
the search of a vehicle incident to arrest was likely unreasonable.355  Justice 
Scalia explained that he joined the majority because a 4–1–4 opinion in an area 
that demanded clarity was unacceptable.356  Thus, he joined the majority in this 
instance because to do otherwise would create confusion in police practice. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In an interview in 2010, Justice Scalia stated, “The only article in faith that 
plays any part in my judging is the commandment, Thou Shalt Not Lie.”357  This 
is likely a commandment to which every Supreme Court Justice who has worn 
the robes would subscribe.  However, in the context of Supreme Court opinions, 
I suggest more is needed.  Not only must the Justice be honest, but they must be 
apparently honest. 
We ask a great deal of the Justices of the Supreme Court.  We expect the 
wisdom of Solomon and the logic of Plato.  We bring to the Court our most 
difficult legal questions and social issues.  The Court is asked to resolve these 
disputes, set rules to govern future disputes, balance a wide variety of interests 
and social needs, and then persuade its audience that the decision is correct.  The 
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Court, as an institution, relies heavily on the persuasive force of its opinions, and 
apparent honesty is critical to that persuasive force.  Thus, not only must 
dishonesty be rejected, but even the appearance of dishonesty must be avoided.  
Politically charged cases, changes in a Justice’s thinking on an issue, and the 
treatment of precedent, all present the potential for appearing untruthful.  By 
approaching these situations with special care and refuting counter arguments, 
distinguishing cases, and explaining apparent jurisprudential changes, Justices 
can enhance the apparent honesty of their opinions. 
